Dynamic investment, debt structure and debt overhang by Gan, Liu et al.
Dynamic investment, debt structure and debt overhang
Liu Gana Xin Xiab,∗ Hai Zhangc,
a School of Finance, Jiangxi University of Finance and Economics, Nanchang, China
b School of Finance, Zhongnan University of Economics and Law, Wuhan, China
c Department of Accounting and Finance, Strathclyde Business School, UK
Abstract We study the impact of the optimal debt and priority structure on the intertwined corporate
financing and investment decisions in a dynamic trade-off model, where the firm simultaneously uses bank
and market debt for project financing. Private bank debt is renegotiable during financial distress, thus it
avoids inefficient and costly bankruptcy losses should the renegotiation be successful. Our model shows: (i)
Shareholders’ bargaining power, renegotiation friction, growth potential, and bankruptcy costs limits bank debt
capacity; (ii) The substitution effect between bank and market debt dominates in most cases; (iii) Bank debt
issuance reduces the bankruptcy risk and speeds firm investment, which mitigates the debt overhand effect;
(iv) Debt priority structure has a monotonic positive effect on firms’ optimal capital structure, the net benefit
of mixed debt financing, and firm valuation, the effect of which is much stronger for weaker shareholders,
therefore, it would be optimal to place bank debt as senior for firm value maximization; (v) The benefit of
mixed debt financing is significant (a firm valuation boost between 5%- 10% ) compared to either the bank
debt exclusive or market debt exclusive debt structure.
JEL Classification: G13; G32; G33
Keywords: Debt Structure, Debt Overhang, Dynamic investment, Renegotiation friction, Shareholders’
bargaining power
∗Corresponding author.
E-mail addresses: ganliu@jxufe.edu.en (Liu Gan), doublexinxiao@yeah.net (Xin Xia), hai.zhang@strath.ac.uk.
1 Introduction
Most existing trade-off capital structure models assume: (i) a firm is optimally financed by a single
type of debt that cannot be renegotiated due to the dispersion of its creditors, providing no insights on
heterogeneous debt and priority structures (Leland 1994, 1998, Hackbarth and Mauer 2012, Diamond and
He 2014, Sundaresan, Wang and Yang 2015); (ii) a firm’s financing decision is dependent of its real investment
decision (Fan and Sundaresan 2000, Hackbarth, Hennessy and Leland 2007), ignoring the most important
intertwined debt overhang effect which is first analyzed by Myers (1977). However, extensive empirical
studies indeed recognize heterogeneity in the sources of debt financing (Rauh and Sufi 2010, Colla, Ippolito
and Li 2013, Becker and Ivashina 2014, Chen, Maslar and Serfling 2020) and the negative impact of debt in
place on firm investment (Hennessy 2004, Alanis, Chava and Kumar 2018).
A large body of recent research has already begun the task of incorporating either the dynamic investment
or various debt structures separately into trade-off capital structure models. Hackbarth, Hennessy and Leland
(2007) assume debt is issued at the same exogenous investment timing under different debt structures.
However, Hackbarth, Hennessy and Leland ignore the fact that the debt structure and investment decisions
interact with each other, thus the optimal timing of investment varies under different debt structures and
so do the timing of debt issuance. Hackbarth and Mauer (2012), Diamond and He (2014), Sundaresan et al.
(2015) indeed investigate the interaction between financing and investment decisions in a dynamic trade-off
model, none of them considers the renegotiable bank debt in their framework. Morellec, Valta and Zhdanov
(2015), Shibata and Nishihara (2015b) incorporate both the dynamic investment and debt structures into
their model to investigate the intertwined effect between a firm’s marginal financing decision (market debt
verse bank debt) and its investment decision. Nevertheless, neither do they consider a mixture of market
and bank debt financing.
Therefore, we adopt a setting that resembles Hackbarth, Hennessy and Leland (2007) and extend their
model by incorporating both dynamic investment (Sundaresan and Wang 2007) and various debt structures.
In our model, a firm’s optimal capital structure are driven by renegotiation cost, bankruptcy cost, tax shield
benefit and investment benefits. Private bank debt is renegotiable during financial distress, thus it avoids
inefficient and costly bankruptcy losses should the renegotiation be successful. However, bank debt does not
always dominate market debt as there exists renegotiation friction specifying a probability of renegotiation
failure (Davydenko and Strebulaev 2007, Favara, Schroth and Valta 2012, Morellec, Valta and Zhdanov
2015), which justifies borrowers demand for market debt. Compared with firms issuing only bank debt or
market debt, our model predicts a firm has the highest market leverage (debt capacity) when issuing a
mixture of bank and market debt. Our model also shows bank debt dominates market debt in most cases
because of its ability of avoiding inefficient bankruptcy via renegotiation. The result turns around as bank
debt loses its edge when the renegotiation friction is higher (either a higher shareholders’ bargaining power
or a higher probability of renegotiation failure) or the tax shield benefit is larger for market debt.
We also incorporate in our analysis several realistic factors that drive the firm’s mix of debt financing and
investment decisions. First, following Fan and Sundaresan (2000), Sundaresan and Wang (2007), Davydenko
and Strebulaev (2007) among others, we incorporate varying shareholders’ bargaining power and renegotia-
tion friction in debt renegotiation. Our model shows that bank debt, on average, dominates market debt in
most cases except when the renegotiation friction is higher (either a higher shareholders’ bargaining power
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or a higher probability of renegotiation failure) or the tax shield benefit is larger for market debt. In such
cases, market debt substitutes more bank debt as the latter loses its edge to market debt.
Second, unlike the dynamic investment models developed in Morellec, Valta and Zhdanov, Shibata and
Nishihara assuming firms choose only either bank or market debt financing, our parsimonious model is able
to investigate the interactions between mixed debt financing and firm investment decisions. We find the
benefit of mixed debt financing is significantly large (a firm valuation boosts between 5%- 10% ) compared
to either bank debt exclusive or market debt exclusive debt structures.
Third, we consider a general debt priority structure in our model including three prevalent used debt
structures, namely senior bank debt, junior bank debt, and pari passu, in practice. Our model predicts that
priority structure has a monotonic positive effect on firms’ optimal capital structure, the net benefit of mixed
debt financing, and firm valuation, the effect of which is much stronger for weaker shareholders (with lower
bargaining power).
We also explore with our model the negative effect of debt overhang on corporate expansion investment
decisions. Our model predicts that, in general, the higher level of existing debt, particular market debt, in
place deters firm investment, which is consistent with (Myers 1977, Hackbarth and Mauer 2012, Diamond
and He 2014). Interestingly, given a constant high level of market debt in place, issuing more bank debt
actually accelerates firm investment when bank debt is granted senior. This is because the renegotiation
feature of bank debt allows shareholders to extract part of renegotiation surplus from bank debt creditors,
which, to some extent, mitigates the debt overhang effect.
Related literature. In order to highlight the contributions of our article, following Hackbarth, Hennessy
and Leland (2007), we summarize the features of related structural trade-off models in Table 1. To be more
specific, this table collects two main strands of recent literature on strategic debt service (columns (1-2))and
dynamic trade-off models with endogenous investment (column (6)).
Fan and Sundaresan (2000) adopt a Nash bargaining game in debt renegotiation to investigate the impact
of varying bargaining power on renegotiation and payout policies. Similarly, Sundaresan and Wang (2007)
provide a parsimonious framework to model strategic interactions between equity holders and debt holders
stronger equity and its impact on ex-ante growth option exercising decisions and firm value. Sundaresan and
Wang find that equity holders bargaining power lowers private debt capacity, reduces firm value, and delays
corporate investment.
Our paper contributes to a growing literature that examines the interaction between corporate financing
and investment decisions in dynamic trade-off models. Hackbarth and Mauer (2012) develop a dynamic mode
to study debt structure and its impact on corporate investment. They find jointly optimal capital and priority
structures can virtually eliminate debt overhang resulting from agency conflicts. Diamond and He (2014)
provide a thorough analysis of the negative effects of debt maturity on firms’ current and future investments
decisions, which is often referred as to debt overhang. Diamond and He show that Myers suggestion, that
short-term debt could possibly mitigate debt overhang problem, can be reversed under different settings even
that short-term debt depends less on firm value. Our study complements Hackbarth and Mauer, Diamond
and He by incorporating strategic debt renegotiation in the analysis of corporate financing and investment
decisions.
Following Hackbarth, Hennessy and Leland (2007), Diamond and He (2014), Wong and Yu (2020), we
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extend the classical Leland-type capital structure framework to a dynamic structural model that simulta-
neously incorporates both flexible investment opportunities and heterogeneous (mixed) debt financing. Our
article is mostly related to that by Hackbarth, Hennessy and Leland (2007). First, inspired by Diamond and
He (2014), Wong and Yu (2020), we incorporate investment decision into Hackbarth, Hennessy and Leland
model. Since the debt structure and investment decisions interact with each other, the optimal timing of
investment varies under different debt structures and so do the timing of debt issuance. Thus, it is nec-
essary to incorporate the investment decision into a dynamic trade-off model. Second, following Fan and
Sundaresan (2000), Sundaresan and Wang (2007), we accommodate varying shareholders’ bargaining powers
in debt renegotiation when a firm is under financial distress. Third, we consider a reasonable restoration of
contractual debt payment and associated tax benefits should EBIT improve. In Hackbarth, Hennessy and
Leland’s model, once the debt renegotiation begins, the debt payment concessions continue forever, regard-
less of whether the EBIT has recovered or not. Fourth, we consider that both the bank debt holders and
market debt holders receive a part of the remaining firm value upon bankruptcy. Thus, we are able to obtain
an interior solution of the mixed debt structure, which means that the optimal bank debt and market debt
interact with each other. Our result is more realistic than that in Hackbarth, Hennessy and Leland, who
substantially assume that the market debt holders receive nothing upon bankruptcy in the main part of their
model. In such an extreme case, they can only obtain a corner solution of the mixed debt structure, which
means that the optimal bank debt and market debt are determined separately and the optimal financing
strategy is to issue the bank debt until its full capacity first, and then issue a positive amount of market
debt afterward.
Table 1: Related structural trade-off models
Negotiable Market Optimal Bargaining Closed-form Investment
debt debt priority power solution endogenous
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Leland (1994) N Y N N Y N
Fan and Sundaresan (2000) Y N N Y Y N
Hackbarth et al. (2007) Y Y Y Y Y N
Sundaresan and Wang (2007) Y N N Y Y Y
Hackbarth and Mauer (2012) N Y Y N Y Y
Diamond and He (2014) N Y N N Y Y
Morellec et al. (2015) Y Y N Y Y Y
Shibata and Nishihara (2015b) Y Y N Y Y Y
Sundaresan et al. (2015) N Y Y N Y Y
Wong and Yu (2020) Y N N Y Y Y
Gan-Xia-Zhang (2020) Y Y Y Y Y Y
The present paper is also related to a set of papers that studies the effects of mixed debt structure and
priority structure (see Morellec, Valta and Zhdanov (2015), Shibata and Nishihara (2015b)) on corporate
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financing and investment decisions. Morellec, Valta and Zhdanov (2015) investigate the choice between bank
and market debt in a firms marginal financing decision and its effects on investment. Shibata and Nishihara
(2015b) develop a model to study the impact of various debt structures under issuance limit constraints on
corporate investment, financing, and debt choice decisions. However, neither Morellec, Valta and Zhdanov
nor Shibata and Nishihara considers the mixed debt financing as the debt choice in their models is assumed
to be mutually exclusive. To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this paper is the first attempt to investigate
the impact of debt heterogeneity and its priority structure on corporate investment in a dynamic trade-off
model where firms simultaneously use bank and market debt. By doing so, we can jointly determine the
optimal bank and market debt mix in our model and shed light on how optimal mixed debt financing affects
firm investment and valuation.
The reminder of this article is organized as follows. Section 2 extends the classical Leland-type capital
structure framework by developing a dynamic trade-off model that simultaneously incorporates both flexible
investment opportunities and heterogeneous (mixed) debt financing. Section 3 solves the model and derives
closed-form solutions for corporate securities, optimal ex-post investment, renegotiation, and default polices,
and optimal capital structure, followed by an examination of two alternative debt structures (market debt
only and bank debt only) in Section 4. Section 5 discusses key model implications as well as some novel
empirical implications generated from our model. Finally, Section 6 concludes. Technical stuff is gathered
in Appendix A.
2 Model setup
Following Hackbarth, Hennessy and Leland (2007) and Diamond and He (2014), we extend the classical
Leland-type capital structure framework to a dynamic structural model which simultaneously incorporates
both flexible investment opportunities and heterogeneous (mixed) debt financing. Throughout the paper,
we assume assets can be continuously traded in a complete and arbitrage-free market.
2.1 Firm cash flows and investment opportunity
Consider a firm with assets-in-place that generates an operating cash flow Xt, which evolves according
to
dXt = (µ+ i(Xt))Xtdt+ σXtdZt,
where the constants µ and σ are the baseline growth rate and volatility of the cash flow, respectively;
{Zt : t ≥ 0} is a standard Brownian motion defined on the risk-neutral probability space, (Ω,F ,P). At any
time t, the firm’s cash flow growth rate is subject to the investment rate i(X), which is dependent on the
current cash flow level X. Following Diamond and He (2014) and Wong and Yu (2020), we assume that the
investment policy is controlled by equity holders and takes a binary value, in that
i (X) =
{
i, if X ≥ Xi;
0, if X < Xi.
(1)
Here, Xi denotes the investment threshold, indicating a firm invests when its cash flow level exceeds Xi. The
random first passage time, T i, that the firm’s cash flow level reaches the threshold, Xi, from below satisfies
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T i = inf{t ≥ 0, Xt = Xi}. In addition, investment incurs a cost, which is given by φi(X)X (Diamond and
He 2014).
Let the constant r > 0 denote the risk-free interest rate. The after-tax present value of an all-equity
financed firm that always invests is given by
Et
[∫ ∞
t
e−r(u−t)((1− τ)Xu − φiXu)du
]
=
(1− τ)(1− φ̃i)
r − (µ+ i)
Xt,
where φ̃ ≡ φ(1−τ) and τ ∈ (0, 1) denotes the corporate tax rate. We denote by Ui ≡
(1−τ)(1−φ̃i)
r−(µ+i) to facilitate
exposition. For convergence, we assume that the interest rate is higher than the maximal (risk-neutral) cash
flow growth rate, in that r > µ + i. Conversely, when the firm never invests, its present value of asset is
given by U0Xt, where U0 ≡ 1−τr−µ . As in Wong and Yu (2020), we assume Π ≡ Ui − U0 > 0 and define Π/U0
to measure the profitability of the firm’s future investment opportunities.
2.2 Debt structure and bankruptcy
Featuring the debt heterogeneity, our model assumes that the firm issues two classes of perpetual debt,
namely bank debt and market debt. The bank debt has a promised coupon payment b, and c for the market
debt. In our benchmark case, bank debt is senior to market debt upon bankruptcy, consistent with the
theoretical prediction in Hackbarth et al. (2007) and the empirical evidence reported by Rauh and Sufi
(2010). That is, the junior market debt lenders will not receive payoff until the senior bank lenders are fully
paid off at bankruptcy. We will investigate alternative debt priority structure later in the model analysis.
Moreover, the coupon payment to the market lenders cannot be modified (write down) outside the formal
bankruptcy process, a feature which is presented by Leland (1994) and supported by the empirical evidence
in Gilson et al. (1990), Asquith et al. (1994). Following Hackbarth, Hennessy and Leland (2007), Shibata
and Nishihara (2015b), Morellec, Valta and Zhdanov (2015), the bank debt coupon payment in our model
can be reduced in the course of private workouts.1
When the firm falls into financial distress (i.e., a credit event occurs) at any future time t, shareholders
initiate a private workout to renegotiate the coupon payment of bank debt. Let Tn = inf{t ≥ 0, Xt = Xn}
be the first passage time of the firm’s cash flow, Xt, to reach the renegotiation (coupon reduction) threshold,
Xn, from above. Thus, the renegotiation threshold splits the firm’s cash flow into two regions: the normal
region and the renegotiation region. Following Fan and Sundaresan (2000), Sundaresan and Wang (2007),
the reduced coupon, denoted by s(X), is a function of the firm’s current cash flow level in the renegotiation
region. Moreover, the tax shield of the bank debt is temporarily suspended in the renegotiation region.
When the firm’s cash flow level recovers to the normal region, the tax shield is restored. In addition, we
assume that the debt renegotiation process is formalized as Nash bargaining, which is consistent with Fan
and Sundaresan (2000), Hackbarth et al. (2007), Sundaresan and Wang (2007). As a result of bargaining,
both shareholders and bank lenders obtain a fraction of the total surplus according to their bargaining powers
η and 1− η respectively.
Debt renegotiation might fail, as discussed in Davydenko and Strebulaev (2007), Favara, Schroth and
Valta (2012), Morellec, Valta and Zhdanov (2015), our model captures such friction by defining a failure
1Since the dispersion of debt holders, the market debt cannot be renegotiated when the firm falls into financial distress.
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probability, q, of the debt renegotiation. Once the renegotiation fails, shareholders declare bankruptcy and
the firm is liquidated. In such a scenario, the absolute priority rule (APR) is enforced and the outside option
value for the shareholder is zero. Furthermore, the new owner will not relever the restructured firm and lose
any future investment opportunities. Let α ∈ [0, 1] denote the bankruptcy loss rate. Thus, at bankruptcy,
both market debt holders and bank debt holders jointly share the liquidation value L(Xt), which is equal to
L(Xt) = (1− α)U0Xt. (2)
Specifically, senior bank debt holders receive the reservation value Rb(Xt) which is given by
Rb(Xt) = min
{
b
r
, L(Xt)
}
, (3)
while junior market debt holders collect the remaining value Rm(Xt) that satisfies
Rm(Xt) = max
{
L(Xt)−
b
r
, 0
}
. (4)
In the benchmark model, we follow Hackbarth, Hennessy and Leland (2007) to consider a general priority
structure. Let the constant ζ ∈ (0, 1] denote the fraction of the liquidation value L(X) that the bank lenders
receive (i.e., Rb(X) = ζL(X)) when the bankruptcy occurs. Then, the market debt holders obtain the
remaining value which is given by Rm = (1 − ζ)L(X). In the extreme case of ζ = 1, it captures the senior
bank debt case defined in Equations (3)-(4). Because the bank lender would reject any debt coupon payment
less than b once L(X) < b/r were not hold (Hackbarth, Hennessy and Leland 2007). Thus, the model with
ζ = 1 provides the claim valuations for the senior bank debt case. Conversely, in the extreme case of ζ = 0,
it provides the claim valuations for the senior market debt case.
By contrast, provided that the debt renegotiation is successful, subsequently to the coupon reduction
of bank debt, the firm might still default on the coupon payment if its fundamental condition continues to
deteriorate. The first passage time of the firm’s cash flow, Xt, to hit the bankruptcy threshold, Xd, from
above is defined as T d = inf{t ≥ 0, Xt = Xd}. At that time, the firm is finally liquidated and outside debt
holders receive the corresponding liquidation value.
3 Investment, financing and valuation of corporate securities
We first derive the solutions of corporate securities and the shareholder’s endogenous decisions given the
firm’s debt structure. Subsequently, we analyze the firm’s optimal debt structure.
Although the ordering of decisions for renegotiation, investment and bankruptcy is endogenous, we follow
Wong and Yu (2020) to assume the sequence of decisions timings for a firm financed with equity, bank debt
and market debt are described as follows:
Xd < Xi < Xn.
This ordering simplifies the presentation of our model solutions, and it always holds with the realistic model
parameter constellations. Let En(X), Bn(X) and Dn(X) denote the values of equity, bank debt and market
debt in the renegotiation region (Xd < X < Xn), respectively. Then, let us denoted by V (X), E(X), B(X)
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and D(X) the values of equity, bank debt and market debt in the normal region (X > Xn), respectively.
The total firm value, denoted by V (X) for X > Xn and Vn(X) for Xd < X < Xn, is therefore defined by
the sum of the values of equity, bank debt and market debt.
3.1 Total firm value
As in Sundaresan and Wang (2007), to obtain the market values of equity and debt, we should provide
the total firm value in advance. In the normal region (X > Xn), the operating cash flows of the total firm
at each time t is given by (1− τ)Xt + τ(b+ c)− φiXt, because the shareholder has realized the investment
policy defined in Equation (1). By contrast, in the renegotiation region (Xd < X < Xn), the operating cash
flows of the total firm at each time t is given by (1 − τ)Xt + τ(b) − φi(Xt)Xt. Moreover, the capital gains
over each time interval [t, t+ dt] is given by E[dV ] for X > Xn and E[dVn] for Xd < X < Xn, where E is an
expectation operator. Applying the dynamic programming method and Itô’s lemma, we have that market
value of total firm satisfies the following ordinary differential equations (ODEs):{
rV (X) = (1− τ)X + τ(b+ c)− φiX + (µ+ i)XV ′(X) + 12σ
2X2V ′′(X), if X ≥ Xn,
rVn (X) = (1− τ)X + τc− φi(X)X + (µ+ i(X))XV ′(X) + 12σ
2X2V ′′(X), if Xd ≤ X < Xn,
(5)
given the shareholder’s optimal investment threshold Xi, optimal renegotiation threshold Xn and optimal
default threshold Xd. Noticing that the investment threshold Xi divides the firm’s cash flow into two
intervals: investment regions for X > Xi with i(X) = i and no-investment regions for Xd < X < Xi with
i(X) = 0.
Equation (5)is simultaneously solved by using the following six boundary conditions:

limX→∞ V (X)/X < +∞, the standard no-bubble condition;
V (Xn) = (1− q)Vn(Xn) + qL(Xn), the value-matching condition at Xn;
V ′(Xn) = (1− q)V ′n(Xn) + q(1− α)U0, the smooth-pasting condition at Xn;
limX↓Xi Vn (X) = limX↑Xi Vn (X) , the value-matching condition at Xi;
limX↓Xi V
′
n (X) = limX↑Xi V
′
n (X) , the smooth-pasting condition at Xi;
Vn (Xd) = L(Xd), the value-matching condition at Xd.
(6)
In Equation (6), because the possibility of bankruptcy is negligible when δ is sufficiently large, we impose the
no-bubble condition for the firm to rule out speculative bubbles. The value-matching and smooth-pasting
conditions at the renegotiation threshold Xn demonstrate that the value function of the total firm should
be continuous and smooth at Xn. At that instant, since the firm’s liquidation probability is reduced by a
factor q, the total firm value is increased. Similarly, the value function of the total firm are continuity and
smoothness conditions at the investment threshold Xi. The value-matching condition at the default threshold
Xd demonstrates an equality between the total firm value and the liquidation value at final bankruptcy. Then,
the total firm value is summarized as follows.
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Proposition 1 Given the shareholder’s optimal investment threshold Xi, optimal renegotiation threshold
Xn and optimal default threshold Xd, in the normal region (X > Xn), the total firm value V (X) satisfies
V (X) = UiX +
τ(b+ c)
r
+G1X
γ1 ,
and in the renegotiation region (Xd < X < Xn), the total firm value Vn(X) is given by
Vn (X) =
{
UiX +
τc
r +G2X
γ1 +G3X
γ2 , if Xi ≤ X < Xn,
U0X +
τc
r +G4X
β1 +G5X
β2 , if Xd < X < Xi.
Here, the constants γ1, γ2, β1, β2, G1, G2, G3, G4 and G5 are defined in Appendix A.
The expression for the total firm value is intuitive. When the firm in the normal region (X > Xn), the
total firm value includes three components. The first two terms are the sum of the expected presented value
of the unlevered firm who always invests and the expected presented value of the tax shield benefit when
there is no default risk. The last term captures the changes in value for possible future financial distress
and temporarily stopping investment. In the renegotiation region (Xd < X < Xn), the firm faces two
different regions depending on whether shareholders stop investment. First, on interval [Xi, Xn), the total
firm value consists of three components. The first two terms are the sum of the expected presented value
of the unlevered firm who always invests and the expected presented value of the tax shield benefit when
there is no default risk. The last two terms capture the value adjustments when the firm enters into the
normal region again or enters into the no-investment region in the future. Second, on the interval [Xd, Xi),
the firm is in the no-investment region, the value of market debt also consists of three components. The
first two terms are the sum of the expected presented value of the unlevered firm who never invests and the
expected presented value of the tax shield benefit when there is no default risk. The last two terms capture
the changes in value by considering both possible future defaults and entering the investment region again.
3.2 Debt value and strategic debt service
To obtain the values of bank debt and market debt, we first solve the Nash bargaining game between
shareholders and bank lenders. With a successful renegotiation, shareholders and bank lenders bargain to
determine the allocation of the total surplus Vn(X)−Dn(X)−ζL(X). The surplus amount that bank lenders
can extract (i.e., the value of bank debt) satisfies
Bn(X; i(X), Xi) = arg max
B̂n
[
Vn(X; i(X), Xi)−Dn(X; i(X), Xi)− B̂n
]η [
B̂n − ζL(X)
]1−η
,
anticipating the shareholder’s optimal investment policy i(X). Solving the above model yields the market
value of bank debt in the renegotiation region (Xd < X < Xn)
Bn(X; i(X), Xi) = Rb(X) + (1− η)
(
Vn(X; i(X), Xi)−Dn(X; i(X), Xi)− ζL(X)
)
. (7)
The market value of bank debt in Equation (7) is given by bank lenders’ reservation value plus a fraction
1 − η of the renegotiation surplus from avoiding costly bankruptcy. Similarly, the market value of equity
En(X) in the renegotiation region is given by
En(X; i(X), Xi) = η
(
Vn(X; i(X), Xi)−Dn(X; i(X), Xi)− ζL(X)
)
. (8)
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Equation (8) shows that shareholders obtain a fraction η of the renegotiation surplus from avoiding costly
bankruptcy.
In the normal region (X > Xn), bank lenders receive the coupon payment b at each time. Moreover,
they also receive capital gains E[dB] over each time interval [t, t+ dt]. By the standard variation principle,
the market value of bank debt B(X) for X > Xn is solved by the following ODE:
rB(X) = b+ (µ+ i)XB′(X) +
σ2
2
X2B′′(X), (9)
given the bank lender’s rational expectation of the shareholder’s realized investment policy i(X) = i. In
Equation (9), the no arbitrage rule implies that the required return for the bank debt (the left-hand side)
should equal to the sum of the debt service (the first term on the right-hand side) and the expected change
in the market value of bank debt on any time interval (the last two terms).
The market value of bank debt is solved subject to the following value-matching and no-bubble conditions:{
B(Xn) = (1− q)Bn (Xn) + qζL(Xn), the value-matching condition at Xn;
limX→∞B(X) =
b
r , the standard no-bubble condition.
The value-matching condition shows that at the renegotiation, bank lenders receive the expected value,
which is equal to the weighted average of the bank debt value after restructuring and the reservation value.
The standard no-bubble condition shows that bank debt becomes risk-free when the firm’s cash flow level
becomes sufficiently large, and thus, its value equals the expected present value of the perpetual debt service
b. Using standard calculations as in Leland (1994), we can derive the value function B(X) for X > Xn.
Then, we can summarize the market debt value as the following proposition.
Proposition 2 Given the shareholder’s optimal investment threshold Xi, optimal renegotiation threshold
Xn and optimal default threshold Xd, in the normal region (X > Xn), bank lenders bearing a coupon flow of
b is worth:
B(X) =
b
r
+
[
(1− q)Bn(Xn) + qζL(Xn)−
b
r
](
X
Xn
)γ1
,
and in the renegotiation region (Xd < X < Xn), the value function Bn(X) for bank lenders bearing a reduced
coupon flow of s(X) is given in Equation (7).
We derive the market debt values as follows. Anticipating the shareholder’s realized investment policy
i(X) = i in the normal region (X > Xn), the value of market debt D(X) satisfies
rD(X) = c+ (µ+ i)XD′(X) +
σ2
2
X2D′′(X). (10)
In the renegotiation region (Xd < X < Xn), the market debt value Dn(X) satisfies
rDn(X) = c+ (µ+ i(X))XD
′
n(X) +
σ2
2
X2D′′n(X), (11)
which is dependent on the shareholder’s optimal investment policy i(X) and the corresponding investment
threshold Xi. In Equations (10) and (11), the left-hand sides represent the return required by market debt
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holders. The right-hand sides are the sum of debt service (the first term) and the expected change in the
value of market debt on any time interval (the last two terms).
Equations (10) and (11) are jointly solved subject to the following six boundary conditions:
limX→∞D(X) =
c
r , the standard no-bubble condition;
D (Xn) = (1− q)Dn (Xn) + q(1− ζ)L(Xn), the value-matching condition at Xn;
D′ (Xn) = (1− q)D′n (Xn) + q(1− α)(1− ζ)U0, the smooth-pasting condition at Xn;
limX↓Xi Dn (X) = limX↑Xi Dn (X) , the value-matching condition at Xi;
limX↓Xi D
′
n (X) = limX↑Xi D
′
n (X) ; the smooth-pasting condition at Xi;
Dn (Xd) = (1− ζ)L(Xd), the value-matching condition at Xd.
(12)
Then, using Equations (10)-(12), we can summarize the solutions for the value of market debt as the following
proposition.
Proposition 3 Given the shareholder’s optimal investment threshold Xi, optimal renegotiation threshold Xn
and optimal default threshold Xd, in the normal region (X > Xn), the value of market debt D(X) satisfies
D (X) =
c
r
+A1X
γ1 , if X ≥ Xn, (13)
and in the renegotiation region (Xd < X < Xn), the value of market debt Dn(X) is given by
Dn (X) =
{
c
r +A2X
γ1 +A3X
γ2 , if Xi ≤ X < Xn,
c
r +A4X
β1 +A5X
β2 , if Xd < X < Xi.
(14)
Here, the constants A1, A2, A3, A4 and A5 are defined in Appendix A.
Proposition 3 shows that in the normal region (X > Xn), the value of market debt is given by the sum of
the expected value of the perpetual coupon flow absent default risk (c/r) and the changes in value for possible
future financial distress and temporarily stopping investment. In the renegotiation region (Xd < X < Xn),
the firm faces two different regions depending on whether shareholders stop investment. First, on the interval
[Xi, Xn), the value of market debt consists of three components. The first term is the default-free debt value
c/r. The last two terms capture the value adjustments when the firm enters into the normal region again
or enters into the no-investment region in the future. Second, on the interval [Xd, Xi), the firm is in the
no-investment region, the value of market debt also consists of three components. The default-free debt
value c/r is given in the first term. The last two terms capture the changes in value by considering both
possible future default and entering the investment region again.
3.3 Equity value and endogenous decisions
In the normal region (X > Xn), the after-tax cash flow net of the investment cost (i.e., dividend) to
shareholders is (1− τ)(Xt− b− c)− φiXt at each time t. Then, the equity value function E(X) for X > Xn
must satisfy the following ODE:
rE(X) = (1− τ)(X − b− c)− φiX + (µ+ i)XE′(X) + σ
2
2
X2E′′(X). (15)
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Equation (15) represents that the required return for holding the firm’s equity (the left-hand side) equals the
after-tax cash flow net of the investment cost plus the expected change in equity value. Solving the value
function E(X) is subject to the following value-matching and no-bubble conditions:{
E(Xn) = (1− q)En (Xn) , the value-matching condition at Xn;
limX→∞
E(X)
X < +∞, the standard no-bubble condition.
Then, we can led to the following proposition.
Proposition 4 Given the shareholder’s optimal investment threshold Xi, optimal renegotiation threshold Xn
and optimal default threshold Xd, in the normal region (X > Xn), the market value of equity E(X) satisfies
E(X) =
(
UiX − (1− τ)
b+ c
r
)
+
[
(1− q)En(Xn)− UiXn + (1− τ)
b+ c
r
](
X
Xn
)γ1
, (16)
and in the renegotiation region (Xd < X < Xn), the market value of equity En(X) is given in Equation (8)
Equation (16) represents that the equity value function in the normal region is given by the sum of the
expected present value of a perpetual flow of dividend and the adjustment in equity value caused by potential
future debt renegotiation, stopping investment and going bankrupt. Shareholders select the renegotiation
threshold Xn to maximize equity value. Thus, the following smooth-pasting condition at the threshold level
Xn should be hold:
E′(Xn) = (1− q)E′n (Xn) .
The above condition translates into nonlinear equations which can be solved numerically due to no closed-
form solutions.
In the renegotiation region (Xd < X < Xn), the equity value function En(X) captures the ex post
optimal investment and bankruptcy decisions selected by shareholders, and the equity value function E(X)
for X > Xn satisfies the following ODE:
rEn(X) = max
i(X)∈{0,i}
(1− τ)(X − c)− s(X)− φi(X)X + (µ+ i(X))XE′n(X) +
σ2
2
X2E′′n(X),
subject to the value-matching boundary conditions at Xn, Xi, and Xd, and the smooth-pasting condition at
Xn and Xi. The first order condition (FOC) for investment i(X) generates the optimal investment threshold
which satisfies
E′n(Xi) = φ.
The equity value En(X) for Xd < X < Xn is given in Equation (8). For the bankruptcy threshold, the
smooth-pasting of En(X) at Xd delivers the endogenous bankruptcy threshold:
E′n(Xd) = 0.
Again, the endogenous default threshold Xd is determined uniquely by a nonlinear equation which will be
solved numerically.
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3.4 Optimal debt structure
We now turn to the discussion of the firm’s optimal debt structure. At the initial financing time,
shareholders select the optimal mixture of bank debt and market debt to maximize the ex-ante equity value,
which is equal to the initial firm value. That is, the firm’s optimal debt structure is solved by the following
optimization problem:
{b∗(X0), c∗(X0)} = arg max
b,c
{E(X0; b, c) +B(X0; b, c) +D(X0; b, c)} ,
given the shareholder’s ex-post optimal investment, debt renegotiation and default policies. The optimal
coupon payment on bank and market debt cannot be obtained analytically. The optimal leverage ratio of
the firm, LR, is measured by the ratio of the market value of the total debt to the market value of the firm,
which is given by
LR(X0; b
∗(X0), c
∗(X0)) =
B(X0; b
∗(X0), c
∗(X0) +D(X0; b
∗(X0), c
∗(X0)
V (X0; b∗(X0), c∗(X0))
.
3.5 Equal priority structure
In this subsection, we turn to consider another priority structure that the bank debt and market debt have
equal priority (pari passu) upon bankruptcy. The total liquidation value of the firm is given in Equation (2),
the reservation value for the bank debt and market debt at bankruptcy are given by
Rb(X) =
b
b+ c
L(X),
Rm(Xt) =
c
b+ c
L(X),
respectively. Under the new priority structure, the valuation for total firm, equity, bank debt and market
debt are similar to those of the baseline model, given the parameter ζ = bb+c .
4 Alternative debt structures
In the previous literature, the firm is either absent for bank debt financing or for future flexible invest-
ment opportunities. The main contribution of this paper is that we develop a dynamic trade-off model of
capital structure by incorporating both the debt financing heterogeneity and future dynamic investment op-
portunities, which generates additional important implications in firms’ financing and investment decisions.
Before demonstrating our main results, we here provide two extreme benchmark models with each considers
only one homogeneous debt issuance.
4.1 Exclusive market debt structure
First, we consider the model with firms financed with equity and market debt exclusively. Let Vc(X),
Ec(X), and Dc(X) denote the values of total firm, equity and market debt, respectively. The corresponding
default and investment thresholds, which are denoted by Xcd and X
c
i , respectively.
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At each time t, the firm deliver a cash flow (1− τ)(Xt − b)− φi(Xt)Xt to shareholders, and the market
value of equity satisfies
rEc(X) = max
i(X)∈{0,i}
(1− τ)(X − c)− φi(X)X + (µ+ i(X))XE′c(X) +
σ2
2
X2E′′c (X), (17)
subject to the following four boundary conditions:
limX→∞Ec(X)/X < +∞, the standard no-bubble condition;
limX↓Xci Ec(X) = limX↑Xci Ec(X), the value-matching condition at X
c
i ;
limX↓Xci E
′
c(X) = limX↑Xci E
′
c(X), the smooth-pasting condition at X
c
i ;
Ec(X
c
d) = 0, the value-matching condition at X
c
d.
In addition, in Equation (17), the FOC for i(X) yields an optimal investment threshold Xci with E
′
c(X
c
i ) = φ
so that the investment policy satisfies Equation (1). The solution for (17) can be summarized as follows.
Proposition 5 For firms financed with equity and market debt exclusively, in the normal operating region
(X > Xcd), given the shareholder’s investment policy and bankruptcy threshold, the market value of equity
Ec (X) satisfies
Ec (X) =

(
UiX − (1− τ) cr
)
+ C1X
γ1 , if Xci ≤ X,(
U0X − (1− τ) cr
)
+ C2X
β1 + C3X
β2 , if Xcd < X < X
c
i .
(18)
where the coefficients C1, C2 and C3 are defined in Appendix A.
The interpretation for Equation (18) is given as follows. In the investment region (X > Xci ), the right-
hand side of equity value demonstrates the expected present value of a perpetual flow of dividend plus
the change in equity value caused by potential future stopping investment and going bankrupt. In the
no-investment region Xcd < X < X
c
i , the first term on the right-hand side of equity value represents the
expected present value of dividend when shareholders do not have flexibility to invest and default on the
debt. The last two terms captures the adjustment in equity value caused by potential future entering into the
investment region again and going bankrupt. The optimal bankruptcy threshold, selected by shareholders,
is determined by the following smooth-pasting condition
lim
X↓Xcd
E′c(X) = 0,
which translates into a nonlinear equation.
Anticipating the shareholder’s investment and default policies, the value of market debt Dc(X) satisfies
rDc(X) = c+ (µ+ i(X))XD
′
c(X) +
σ2
2
X2D′′c (X),
subject to the following four boundaries conditions:
limX→∞Dc(X) =
c
r , the standard no-bubble condition;
limX↓Xci Dc(X) = limX↑Xci Dc(X), the value-matching condition at X
c
i ;
limX↓Xci D
′
c(X) = limX↑Xci D
′
c(X), the smooth-pasting condition at X
c
i ;
Dc(X
c
d) = L(X
c
d), the value-matching condition at X
c
d.
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Proposition 6 For firms financed with equity and market debt exclusively, in the normal operating region
(X > Xcd), given the shareholder’s optimal investment threshold X
c
i and bankruptcy threshold X
c
d, the value
of market debt Dc (X) satisfies
Dc (X) =

c
r + F1X
γ1 , if Xci ≤ X,
c
r + F2X
β1 + F3X
β2 , if Xcd < X < X
c
i
. (19)
where the coefficients F1, F2 and F3 are defined in Appendix A.
The expressions given in Equation (19) for the value of market debt are similar to those provided for
the value of market debt in Equations (13) and (14). We thus obtain a similar interpretation. Finally,
the optimal capital structure decisions, chosen to maximize the ex-ante equity value (initial firm value), is
determined by c∗c(X0) = argmaxc Vc(X0; c).
4.2 Exclusive bank debt structure
We now consider firms financed with equity and bank debt exclusively, which is similar to Wong and Yu
(2020). To facilitate exposition, let us denote by Eb(X), Bb(X) and Vb(X) the equity value and the debt
value, and the firm value, respectively, in the normal region. Moreover, let Enb(X), Bnb(X) and Vnb(X)
denote the equity value and the debt value, and the firm value, respectively, in the renegotiation region.
The corresponding investment, bankruptcy, and renegotiation thresholds are denoted by Xbi , X
b
d and X
b
n,
respectively.
Under the exclusive bank debt structure (i.e., c = 0 in the baseline model), as shown in Fan and
Sundaresan (2000), Sundaresan and Wang (2007), Wong and Yu (2020), the presence of renegotiation with
strategic debt service ensures that shareholders will never go bankrupt in equilibrium, i.e., the bankruptcy
threshold Xbd = 0. Moreover, the ODEs for the total firm value are similar to those of the baseline model
(i.e., Equations. (8) and (9)), given the specified coupon levels for bank debt. Solving the total firm value
subjects to the standard no bubble condition, the value-matching boundary conditions at Xbn, X
b
i , and X
b
d,
and the smooth-pasting condition at Xbn and X
b
i .
Then, we can provide the following proposition.
Proposition 7 For firms financed with equity and bank debt exclusively, given the shareholder’s optimal
investment threshold Xbi , optimal renegotiation threshold X
b
n and optimal default threshold X
b
d, in the normal
region (X > Xn), the total firm value Vb(X) satisfies
Vb (X) = UiX +
τb
r
+H1X
γ1 , if X ≥ Xbn,
and for Xd < X < Xn, the total firm value Vbn(X) is given by
Vnb (X) =
{
UiX +H2X
γ1 +H3X
γ2 , if Xbi ≤ X < Xbn,
U0X +H4X
β2 , if X < Xbi .
where the constants H1, H2, H3, and H4 are given in Appendix A.
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In the absence of market debt financing (i.e., c = 0), the Nash bargaining result between shareholders
and bank lenders implies that the equity value Enb(X) and the bank debt value Bnb(X) in the renegotiation
region (Xbi < X < X
b
n) are simply given by
Bnb(X; i(X), Xi) = (1− α)L(X) + (1− η)
(
Vnb(X; i(X), X
b
i )− (1− α)L(X))
)
,
Enb(X; i(X), Xi) = η
(
Vnb(X; i(X), X
b
i )− (1− α)L(X)
)
.
Under such a situation, the optimal investment policy is also given by the condition Eb
′
n (X
b
i ) = φ, which
derives the following proposition (see the Appendix A.3 of Wong and Yu (2020) for the proof).
Proposition 8 When the marginal benefit of investment is sufficiently large relative to the marginal cost of
investment φ, shareholders always invests (i.e., Xbi = 0), and thus, there is no debt overhang problem for a
firm financed with equity and bank debt exclusively.
In the normal region (X > Xbn), the ODE for the equity value function is simply given by Equation (15)
but with c = 0, subject to the value-matching Eb(X
b
n) = (1 − q)Enb(Xbn) and the no-bubble condition
limX→∞Eb(X)/X < +∞. The optimal renegotiation threshold is given by the smooth-pasting condition
E′b(X
b
n) = (1 − q)E′nb(Xbn). Similarly, the value of bank debt Bnb(X) for X > Xbn satisfies the ODE
that given by (9) but with c = 0. Thus, the value functions for the equity value and the bank debt
value respectively resemble Equations (16) and (2) with c = 0 and ζ = (1 − α), where the corresponding
investment and renegotiation thresholds are replaced by Xbi and X
b
n, respectively. Finally, shareholders
choose the optimal coupon payment c∗b to maximize the ex-ante equity value (initial firm value), in that
c∗b(X0) = argmaxb Vb(X0; b).
5 Model implications
In this section, we consider important model implications from our quantitative analysis. Sections 5.1
defines the baseline value of the parameters used in our model. Section 5.2 discusses the optimal capital
structure decisions for three types of firms issuing only bank debt, only market debt, and a mixture of both,
respectively. It further analyses the optimal composition of debt structure, which identifies a substitution
effect between bank and market debt issuance. Section 5.3 investigates comparative statics of the optimal
ex-post investment, renegotiation, and default policies with varying parameters’ value. Section 5.4 considers
the debt priority structure and its effects on firm investment (debt overhang) and firm value. Section 5.5
shows the net benefit of issuing a mixture of bank and market debt compared with the bank debt only or
market debt only scenarios. Some novel empirical implications observed from our model are summarized in
Section 5.6.
5.1 Parameter calibration and choice
Following the dynamic capital structure literature, we use the following annualized parameter values for
our numerical analysis. The initial level of productivity is normalized to X0 = 1. Similar to Leland (1998),
Hackbarth, Rivera and Wong (2019), the risk-free interest rate is r = 5%, the risk-neutral baseline growth
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rate is µ = 1%, the volatility is = 25%, the effective tax rate is τ = 20%, and the bankruptcy cost is α = 40%.
The shareholders’ bargaining power is taken to be η = 0.65. This is consistent with Danis and Gamba (2018)
who calibrates a 65% bargaining power for the shareholders. Finally, we set the incremental productivity
growth rate to be i0 = 2%, and the investment cost to be φ = 8 for productivity growth for the project.
More specifically, Table 2 reports the parameter values for the benchmark model and all the parameters take
the baseline parameter values unless otherwise stated.
Table 2: Baseline parameter values
Variable Symbol Value
Risk-adjusted growth rate µ 1%
Volatility σ 25%
Risk-free interest rate r 5%
Bank debt coupon rate b
Market debt coupon rate c
Effective tax rate τ 20%
Bankruptcy cost rate α 40%
Investment cost φh 8
Productivity growth rate i0 2%
Shareholders’ bargaining power η 65%
Initial value of cash flow X0 1.00
Renegotiation failure probability q 30%
Debt priority ζ 1
5.2 Optimal market leverage and debt composition
In this section, we investigate a firm’s optimal leverage under three different scenarios that the firm issues
a mixture of bank and mark debt, bank debt only, and market debt only, respectively. Overall, the firm
has the highest market leverage when issuing a mixture of bank and market debt as indicated in Figure 1.
Also, bank debt increases a firm’s debt capacity in most of our parameter regions except for the cases with a
higher renegotiation friction failure probability or a higher effective tax rate. This is straightforward as the
renegotiation friction indeed disincentivizes the bank debt issuance and bank debt has less tax shield benefit
as its coupon might be reduced due to renegotiation.
Consistent with the standard strand of the trade-off capital structure literature, e.g. Leland (1994, 1998),
Figure 1 shows a decline (rise) in optimal leverage with the bankruptcy cost (effective tax rate). Consistent
with empirical evidence that risky small firms use privately placed debt almost exclusively (Blackwell and
Kidwell 1988, Denis and Mihov 2003), Panel B of Figure 1 shows that the capacity of private bank debt
increases with asset volatility. This is mainly because bank debt substitutes more market debt when a firm’s
cash flow is riskier to avoid bankruptcy inefficiency.
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Figure 1: The comparative statics of the firm’s optimal market leverage under three different types of debt
structure: i.e. the mix of bank and market debt, bank debt only, and market debt only, respectively.
Figure 2 shows the optimal composition of bank and market debt for different values of parameters. In
general, there exists a substitution effect between bank debt and market debt. For example, firms tend to
substitute bank debt with market debt when shareholders have higher bargaining power, the renegotiation
failure probability increases, the investment value is bigger, and the bankruptcy cost is larger, as reflected
in Figure 2 Panel A, C, D, and E, respectively. This is mainly because bank debt loses its edge against
market debt when shareholders could extract more from creditors and the renegotiation friction is severe.
Interestingly, bank debt issuance might even speed the bankruptcy process should there be an extremely
high negotiation failure probability as we assume the firm enters into liquidation once the renegotiation fails.
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Figure 2: The comparative statics of the optimal debt composition when the firm is financed with a mixture
of bank and market debt, and the bank debt is granted senior to the market debt.
5.3 Optimal ex-post policies: investment, renegotiation and default
Figure 3 illustrates ex-post investment, renegotiation and default policies under two different types of
firm debt structures. There are several implications from our results.
First, shareholders’ bargaining power has a non-monotonic effect on the ex-post default policy. On one
hand, all else equal, stronger shareholders (with higher bargaining power) delay bankruptcy as they are able
to extract more renegotiation surplus in a private workout. On the other hand, market debt substitutes more
bank debt when shareholders have stronger bargaining power, leading to a higher default threshold. In our
model, stronger shareholders default earlier as the negative effect from substitution dominates the positive
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Figure 3: The comparative statics of the optimal ex-post investment and default policies for firms with
either a mixed debt structure or a market debt only structure. The blue solid line (red dashed line) plots
the investment threshold of a firm with mixed debt composition ( market debt only financing). The black
dotted line (green dash-dotted line) plots the default threshold for a firm with mixed debt financing ( market
debt only structure).
one from the surplus extraction, which is consistent with the empirical evidence found in Colonnello, Efing
and Zucchi (2019).
Second, firms issuing bank debt along with market debt accelerate corporate investment and the bank
debt issuance on average mitigates ex-post debt overhang, the effect of which is much stronger (the gap
between the blue solid line and the red dash line is wider in Figure 3) when the negotiation failure rate is
lower (Panel C), the bankruptcy cost is smaller (Panel E), and the corporate tax rate is higher (Panel F).
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Third, Panel B of Figure 3 illustrates the monotonic effect of asset volatility on firm investment and default
polices. The bankruptcy threshold declines with asset volatility due to the real option value of waiting, as
noted in Sundaresan, Wang and Yang (2015), Wong and Yu (2020). Also, bank debt substitutes market
debt more when asset volatility is higher (the equity feature or bank debt due to renegotiation), delaying the
default trigger. Consistent with the standard real option theory such as McDonald and Siegel (1986), a firm
accelerates investment when its asset volatility is higher as its investment threshold monotonically decreases
with asset volatility.
Fourth, shareholders impede firm investment (future asset growth) as a result of debt overhang when the
investment value is lower (Panel D), the bankruptcy cost is smaller (Panel E), and the corporate tax rate is
higher (Panel F). It is straightforward that a firm is less likely to invest a low-value project. As a firm trades
the debt tax shield benefit off its bankruptcy cost when issuing debt, it will optimally issue more debt when
the bankruptcy cost is smaller or the tax rate is higher. In such cases, creditors will get most of the future
investment value due to debt overhang, which in turn reduces shareholders’ incentive to investment.
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Figure 4: The comparative statics of the ex-post renegotiation threshold for firms with either a mixed debt
structure or a bank debt only structure.
Fifth, shareholders have less incentive to renegotiate the bank debt contract if the renegotiation friction is
higher, which is consistent with the economic intuition that higher renegotiation friction significantly reduces
the value of the default option. Also, higher tax rates increase shareholders’ renegotiation incentive as the
bank debt holders will share less option value of expansion (higher investment thresholds) in such scenarios.
Consistent with the value of waiting (real option) theory as in McDonald and Siegel (1986), Wong and Yu
(2020), stronger shareholders will delay debt renegotiation as they are able to extract more renegotiation
surplus.
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5.4 Debt structure, debt overhang and firm valuation
We now turn to investigate how a firm’s debt structure and its priority structure affect its ex-post
investment decisions and the firm valuation. To be specific, we first illustrate the effects of varying debt
compositions on firm investment (firm valuation) in Figure 5 (Figure 6) under three alternative priority
structures (namely, senior bank debt, senior market debt, and equal priority)2. Then, we summarize the
key results of ex-post policies, optimal coupon payments, and the value of corporate securities under each
type of these priority structures in Table 3. Finally, inspired by Hackbarth and Mauer (2012), we extend
our benchmark model by considering arbitrary priority structure and the effects of which on ex-post policies,
leverage, and firm valuation are presented in Figure 7- 8.
Figure 5 shows the ex-post investment policy as a function of bank coupon and market coupon payments
for a firm with a mixed debt issuance placing bank debt as senior (Panel A), junior (Panel B), and equal
priority (Panel C), respectively. In general, the higher level of existing debt, particularly for market debt, in
place impedes firm investment as expected. Interestingly, given a constant high level of market debt in place,
issuing more bank debt accelerates firm investment when bank debt is granted senior, as indicated in Panel
A of Figure 5. This is because the renegotiation feature of bank debt allows shareholders to extract part
of the renegotiation surplus from bank debt creditors, which, to some extent, mitigates the debt overhang
effect.
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Figure 5: The ex-post investment policy Xi as a function of promised coupon payments to the bank (b)
and to the market (c) when the bank debt is senior (Panel A), junior(Panel B), and equal (Panel C) to the
market debt, respectively.
Figure 6 illustrates the effect of debt structure on firm valuation under three alternative priority struc-
tures. Generally speaking, the firm value is much more sensitive to its junior debt’s value and firms optimally
issue more senior debt (either bank or market debt), as indicated in Panel A and B of Figure 6. Consis-
2See Broadie and Chernov (2007), Hackbarth and Mauer (2012) among others for the discussion of alternative debt priority
structures.
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tent with the empirical evidence provided by Rauh and Sufi (2010) that “low-credit-quality firms have a
multi-tiered capital structure consisting of both secured bank debt with tight covenants and subordinated
non-bank debt with loose covenants”, our numerical results show that firms with a mixed of bank and market
debt placing bank debt as senior have the highest value compared to other priority structures. Table 3 also
verifies this result that the firm with a mixed debt structure consisting senior bank debt and junior market
debt has the highest firm value of 28.38, 2.5% higher compared to the opposite case (27.70).
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Figure 6: The firm value as a function of promised coupon payments to the bank (b) and to the market (c)
when the bank debt is (Panel A), junior(Panel B), and equal (Panel C) to the market debt, respectively.
Note that there exists an interior firm value optimum for both classes of debt under each priority structure,
i.e. in Panel A, V (b∗, c∗) = 28.38, where b∗ = 0.88 and c∗ = 0.40; in Panel B, V (b∗, c∗) = 27.70, where
b∗ = 0.14 and c∗ = 0.84; and in Panel C, V (b∗, c∗) = 28.01, where b∗ = 0.67 and c∗ = 0.45.
Table 3: Ex-post policies, optimal leverage, and firm valuation for firms issuing a mixed of band and
market debt under three alternative priority structures.
Priority Structure Xd Xi Xn b
∗ c∗ Lb Lc E(X0) V (X0)
Bank debt is senior (ζ = 1) 0.18 0.25 0.73 0.88 0.40 44.13% 22.29% 9.53 28.38
Equal priority (ζ = bb+c) 0.16 0.21 0.76 0.67 0.45 34.39% 26.02% 11.09 28.01
Market debt is senior (ζ = 0) 0.24 0.30 0.62 0.14 0.84 8.31% 48.62% 11.93 27.70
Table 3 also reports optimal ex-post investment, default, and renegotiation policies for three alternative
priority structures. The priority structure,ζ∗, is endogenously determined by the optimal coupon payments,
b∗ and c∗, given than ζ ≡ bb+c for the equal priority scenario. We find that firms are more (less) likely to
invest (default) and renegotiate under the equal priority structure.
Now we consider a general case of an arbitrary priority structure (ζ ∈ [0 1]). To be specific, given
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an arbitrary priority structure, ζ, we investigate how the priority structure affects firms’ financing and real
investment decisions. Figure 7 presents the monotonic effects of priority structure (ζ) on optimal capital
structure, the net benefit of mixed debt financing, and firm valuation. Firms tend to have higher leverages,
the greater benefit of mixed debt financing, and larger firm values when bank debt is more secured (a higher
ζ), consistent with Rauh and Sufi (2010). Regarding the ex-post policies, firms, on average, accelerate
investment, delay bankruptcy, and speed debt renegotiation when bank debt priority is higher, as indicated
in Figure 8.
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Figure 7: The effects of debt priority structure on the optimal debt composition (Panel A), the net benefit
of mixed debt financing (Panel B), and the value of corporate securities (Panel C). The net benefit of mixed
debt financing is reported in percentage
5.5 The net benefit of mixed debt financing
In this subsection, we aim to investigate the market situations in which a firm with mixed debt financing
is more likely to achieve benefits. To be more specific, The net debt benefit of mixed debt financing over
exclusive bank debt financing (exclusive market debt financing) is defined as V−VbVb × 100% (
V−Vc
Vc
× 100%),
where V , Vb, and Vc is firm value with optimal mixed debt financing, exclusive bank debt financing, and
exclusive market debt financing, respectively. Our model provides an investment-based explanation for the
observed fact that why many corporations choose mixed debt financing (Rauh and Sufi 2010). Figure 9
shows the comparative statics of the net benefit of mixed debt financing for varying parameter values. In all
simulated scenarios, firms with mixed debt financing outperform other firms with either only bank debt or
only market debt. The increase of firm valuation could be as large as over 30% for a higher tax rate (Panel F
of Figure 9). In general, our model indicates mixed debt financing could enhance firm value by 5% to 10%.
We also find, in most cases, bank debt exclusive financing structure dominates market debt only one,
reflecting an edge of bank debt from the renegotiation. Market debt exclusive structure dominates only
when there is a higher shareholders’ bargaining power, larger renegotiation friction, or a higher tax rate.
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Figure 8: The effects of debt priority structure on the optimal ex-post default policy (Panel A), investment
policy (Panel B), and firm valuation (Panel C) with three levels of shareholders’ bargaining power.
This is because, in such scenarios, market debt is more favorable as it avoids renegotiation failure (higher
renegotiation friction) and has greater tax shield benefit (higher tax rate).
5.6 Empirical implications
Our model provides novel empirical implications regarding how debt renegotiation and its frictions such as
shareholders’ bargaining power and the failure probability of renegotiation affect corporate optimal financing
debt composition.
Observation 1: Bank debt dominates market debt in most cases because of its ability to avoid inefficient
bankruptcy via renegotiation. The result turns around as bank debt loses its edge when the renegotiation
friction is higher (either a higher shareholders’ bargaining power or a higher probability of renegotiation
failure) or the tax shield benefit is larger for market debt.
Consistent with Rauh and Sufi (2010), Colla, Ippolito and Li (2013), Crouzet (2017) among others, the
model also matches the stylized fact that firms tend to use multi-tier debts to finance corporate investment.
Observation 2: The benefit of mixed debt financing is significantly large (a firm valuation boosts between
5%- 10% as indicated in Figure 9) compared to either bank debt exclusive or market debt exclusive debt
structures. Firms optimal trade the benefit of debt renegotiation off its frictions when making financing
decisions.
In the framework of our model, we are able to investigate the intertwined effect of corporate heterogeneous
debt financing and investment decisions on firm valuation.
Observation 3: The issuance of bank debt along with market debt accelerates firm investment, which
mitigates the ex-post debt overhang effect. This negative effect is much stronger when the renegotiation failure
probability or the bankruptcy cost is lower.
Observation 4: Our model predicts that priority structure (ζ) has a monotonic positive effect on firms’
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Figure 9: The comparative statics of the net benefit of mixed debt financing compared to the bank debt
only and the market debt only scenarios. The net benefit of mixed debt financing is reported in percentage.
optimal capital structure, the net benefit of mixed debt financing, and firm valuation, the effect of which is
much stronger for weaker shareholders (with lower bargaining power).
6 Conclusion
Most extant theoretical literature on strategic debt service, see Hackbarth, Hennessy and Leland (2007),
Hackbarth and Mauer (2012), Morellec, Valta and Zhdanov (2015), Shibata and Nishihara (2015a,b) among
others, ignore one of the most important facts that firms simultaneously use bank and market debt (Rauh
and Sufi 2010). The main contribution of this paper is that we integrate the two strands of literature, en-
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dogenous investment and mixed debt structure, by developing a dynamic trade-off model that simultaneously
incorporates both flexible investment opportunities and heterogeneous (mixed) debt financing. We study the
impact of the optimal debt and priority structure on the intertwined corporate financing and investment de-
cisions in a dynamic trade-off model, where the firm simultaneously uses bank and market debt for financing.
Private bank debt is renegotiable during financial distress, thus it avoids inefficient and costly bankruptcy
losses should the renegotiation be successful. However, bank debt does not always dominate market debt
as there exists renegotiation friction specifying a probability of renegotiation failure. By considering both
the endogenous investment and debt heterogeneity in a parsimonious pricing model, we shed light on the
interactions between mixed debt financing and investment decisions when shareholders optimally choose
growth option exercise, renegotiation and default policies and the firm’s optimal capital structure are driven
by renegotiation cost, bankruptcy cost, tax shield benefit and investment benefits.
We have four important results with respect of the impact of he debt structure and its priority structure
on corporate investment and firm valuation. First, bank debt dominates market debt in most cases because
of its ability to avoid inefficient bankruptcy via renegotiation. The result turns around as bank debt loses
its edge when the renegotiation friction is higher (either a higher shareholders’ bargaining power or a higher
probability of renegotiation failure) or the tax shield benefit is larger for market debt. Second, the benefit
of optimal mixed debt financing is significantly large (a firm valuation boosts between 5%- 10%) compared
to either bank debt exclusive or market debt exclusive debt structures. Firms optimal trade the benefit
of debt renegotiation off its frictions when making financing decisions. Third, The issuance of bank debt
along with market debt accelerates firm investment, which mitigates the ex-post debt overhang effect. This
negative effect is much stronger when the renegotiation failure probability or the bankruptcy cost is lower (i.e.
bank debt has the largest edge over market debt). However, shareholders’ bargaining power, renegotiation
friction, growth potential, and bankruptcy costs limit bank debt capacity. Fourth, debt priority structure has
a monotonic positive effect on firms’ optimal capital structure, the net benefit of mixed debt financing, and
firm valuation, the effect of which is much stronger for weaker shareholders, therefore, it would be optimal
to place bank debt as senior for firm value maximization.
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Appendix A Defined constants in Propositions
The constants G1, G2, G3, G4 and G5 are given by
G1 = m1X
−γ1
n + (1− q)
(
G2 +G3X
γ2−γ1
n
)
,
G2 = m3X
−γ1
i +G4X
β1−γ1
i +G5X
β2−γ1
i −G3X
γ2−γ1
i ,
G3 =
m2 − γ1m1
(γ1 − γ2)(1− q)Xγ2n
,
G4 =
Xβ2i (γ1 − β2)m4 −X
β2
d [m3 − γ1m3 −G3(γ2 − γ1)X
γ2
i ]
(γ1 − β2)Xβ2i X
β1
d − (γ1 − β1)X
β1
i X
β2
d
,
G5 =
Xβ1d [m3 − γ1m3 −G3(γ2 − γ1)X
γ2
i ]−X
β1
i (γ1 − β1)m4
(γ1 − β2)Xβ2i X
β1
d − (γ1 − β1)X
β1
i X
β2
d
,
where the constants γ1, γ2, β1, β2, m1, m2, m3 and m4 are given by
γ1 = −
1
σ2
(µ+ i− σ2
2
)
+
√(
µ+ i− σ
2
2
)2
+ 2rσ2
 ,
γ2 = −
1
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(µ+ i− σ2
2
)
−
√(
µ+ i− σ
2
2
)2
+ 2rσ2
 ,
β1 = −
1
σ2
(µ− σ2
2
)
+
√(
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2
2
)2
+ 2rσ2
 ,
β2 = −
1
σ2
(µ− σ2
2
)
−
√(
µ− σ
2
2
)2
+ 2rσ2
 ,
m1 = q [L(Xn)− UiXn]−
τ(qc+ b)
r
,
m2 = q
[
L′(Xn)Xn − UiXn
]
,
m3 = U0Xi − UiXi,
m4 = −U0Xd −
τc
r
.
The constants A1, A2, A3, A4 and A5 are given as follows
A1 = q
(
(1− ζ)L(Xn)−
c
r
)
X−γ1n + (1− q)(A2 +A3Xγ2−γ1n ),
A2 = A4X
β1−γ1
i +A5X
β2−γ1
i −A3X
γ2−γ1
i ,
A3 =
q(1− ζ)(1− α)U0Xn − qγ1 [(1− ζ)L(Xn)− c/r]
(γ1 − γ2)Xγ2n
,
A4 =
(γ1 − β2) [(1− ζ)L(Xd)− c/r]Xβ2i +A3(γ2 − γ1)X
γ2
i X
β2
d
(γ1 − β2)Xβ2i X
β1
d − (γ1 − β1)X
β1
i X
β2
d
,
A5 =
A3(γ1 − γ2)Xγ2i X
β1
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β1
i
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β1
i X
β2
d
,
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The constants C1, C2 and C3 are given by
C1 = (U0 − Ui)(Xci )1−γ1 + C2(Xci )β1−γ1 + C3(Xci )β2−γ1 ,
C2 =
(1− γ1)(U0 − Ui)Xci (Xcd)β2 − (U0Xcd − (1− τ)c/r) (β2 − γ1)(Xci )β2
(β2 − γ1)(Xci )β2(Xcd)β1 − (β1 − γ1)(Xci )β1(Xcd)β2
,
C3 =
(U0X
c
d − (1− τ)c/r) (β1 − γ1)(Xci )β1 − (1− γ1)(U0 − Ui)Xci (Xcd)β1
(β2 − γ1)(Xci )β2(Xcd)β1 − (β1 − γ1)(Xci )β1(Xcd)β2
.
The constants F1, F2, and F3 are given by
F1 = F2(X
c
i )
β1−γ1 + F3(X
c
i )
β2−γ1 ,
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(
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.
The constants H1, H2, H3, and H4 are given by
H1 = (qL(Xn)− qUiXn − τb/r)(Xbn)−γ1 + (1− q)
(
H2 +H3(X
b
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γ2−γ1
)
,
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